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Abstract

Proponents of laissez-faire economic philosophy have long relied upon the concept of the “invisible hand” to
justify non-intervention by governments in markets. The term is typically interpreted to describe how the
independent actions of self-interested individuals can lead to a beneficial societal outcome. Since Adam Smith
introduced the concept in 1776, the invisible hand has become an important foundation of economic analysis
and has consistently been a source of controversy, debate, and policy inspiration. As one of the core tenets of
neoclassical economic theories and the Chicago School of economic thought, the invisible hand has been
associated with the modern shift in emphasis from regulation to free market philosophy. However, the appeal
of the concept has somewhat diminished in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, with many blaming rising
income inequality and reduced social mobility on lax regulations and limited oversight of the financial sector.
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Book Review

Virtual Competition: The Promise and
Perils of the Algorithm-Driven Economy,
by Ariel Ezrachi & Maurice E. Stucke1
ROBERT VAN DE MARK2
PROPONENTS OF LAISSEZ-FAIRE ECONOMIC PHILOSOPHY have long relied upon

the concept of the “invisible hand” to justify non-intervention by governments
in markets. The term is typically interpreted to describe how the independent
actions of self-interested individuals can lead to a beneficial societal outcome.3
Since Adam Smith introduced the concept in 1776, the invisible hand has
become an important foundation of economic analysis and has consistently been
a source of controversy, debate, and policy inspiration.4 As one of the core tenets
of neoclassical economic theories and the Chicago School of economic thought,
the invisible hand has been associated with the modern shift in emphasis from
regulation to free market philosophy.5 However, the appeal of the concept has
somewhat diminished in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, with many blaming
rising income inequality and reduced social mobility on lax regulations and limited
oversight of the financial sector.6 Particularly in the context of competition law,
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some experts question the effectiveness of the neoclassical model that created the
merger-friendly environment of the 1990s, which contributed to many financial
institutions becoming “too big to fail.”7 Naturally, some competition experts
have begun to consider other rapidly evolving industries where application of
traditional free market philosophy may lead to the creation of anti-competitive
market dynamics and negative societal outcomes.
In Virtual Competition: The Promise and Perils of the Algorithm-Driven
Economy, Ariel Ezrachi and Maurice E. Stucke explore the transformative impact
that “Big Data,” computer algorithms, artificial intelligence, and machine
learning have had on competitive markets and overall consumer welfare.
By examining two contradictory themes—the commonly accepted promise of
a more competitive environment under the “algorithm-driven economy” and its
less-discussed perils—Ezrachi and Stucke analyze the overarching effect that new
technologies and market structures have on competition, privacy, democratic
ideals, and overall consumer well-being. In particular, the authors attempt to
demonstrate how new technologies are challenging traditional dynamics of
competition and giving rise to an entirely new environment—one that displays
the characteristics of competitive markets, but is driven by different forces. In the
words of the authors, “[t]he good old invisible hand of competition, which
safeguarded our welfare when we shopped in our local fruit market, is being
displaced by the digitalized hand.”8 Given the presence of these distinct market
forces, the authors argue that some type of intervention by regulators is necessary
in order to preserve competitive markets and protect consumer privacy interests.

I. EXAMINING HIDDEN FORCES ON MODERN MARKETS
CREATED BY THE USE OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES
Ezrachi and Stucke venture behind the “façade of virtual competition”
by presenting three unique scenarios that demonstrate the newly emerging
anti-competitive dynamics created by new technologies.9 In the first scenario, the
authors address how algorithms and other advancing technologies can facilitate
collusion and cartel activity. Ezrachi and Stucke describe the shift “from a world
where executives expressly collude in smoke-filled hotel rooms” to one where
pricing algorithms that allow firms to engage in tacit collusion are used to set
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the market price above an efficient level.10 In the second scenario, the authors
suggest that firms are beginning to use advanced technology to engage in almost
perfect behavioral discrimination. Powerful firms are collecting unprecedented
amounts of information about individual consumers to exploit biases, use
targeted advertising, and adjust prices to minimize consumer surplus.11 In the
final scenario, the authors address a new competitive dynamic arising between
major players in the digital ecosystem, which the authors refer to as a “Frenemy”
relationship.12 This dynamic highlights the complexity of the online ecosystem
where “super-platforms,” such as Google and Apple, have a disproportionate
amount of power and influence over independent developers.13
These scenarios are each particularly compelling because they are not
conjectural—competition authorities are actually dealing with these issues
today—and the authors frequently contextualize their conceptual framework
using real world examples. Beyond present day cases, the authors also provide
a forward-looking perspective for each of the issues, presenting possible future
developments in each scenario. While this type of information is naturally more
theoretical, it assists the reader with understanding the potential negative impact
of these developments on markets if left unchecked.
When outlining each scenario, Ezrachi and Stucke frequently compare and
contrast each topic using traditional neoclassical economic theory and modern
behavioural economic theory. The authors consistently argue that you cannot
adequately understand the complexity of these competition issues by strictly using
the lens of neoclassical economic analysis.14 While the authors make it clear they
endorse the use of behavioural economics to view the issues through a “prism of
fairness and equality,”15 the inclusion of competing theories provides readers with
context regarding common counterarguments to the authors’ positions and how
economic analysis has generally evolved over time.
The well-designed structure of the book also makes it easy for readers to
understand the sometimes-technical information and critically assesses the
authors’ arguments. At the end of each section, the authors provide a nuanced
reflection of the material covered and outline the enforcement tools that currently
exist across jurisdictions to address the issues raised. This structure puts readers
10.
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14.

Ibid at 36-37.
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in a better position to evaluate different options when the authors ultimately
provide recommendations near the conclusion of the book.

II. CONTRIBUTION TO MODERN COMPETITION LAW AND
ANTITRUST THEORY
Virtual Competition provides a powerful theoretical cornerstone for future
study of anti-competitive market dynamics caused by the use of increasingly
sophisticated algorithmic technology. As the scenarios described in the book
become increasingly commonplace, further research on the empirical effects of
tacit collusion caused by the “digitalized hand” of the market will surely follow.
As the authors note, one of the most important issues with anti-competitive
market dynamics is the general lack of public and regulatory awareness. On the
surface, online markets typically appear competitive with many pro-competitive
attributes, such as lower search costs and fewer barriers to market entry.16 However,
as the authors note, behind this “competitive veneer” new strategies powered by a
complex web of algorithms are rapidly developing and maximizing firms’ profits,
while at the same time harming societal welfare.17 Despite this, there is very
little relevant discussion in the academic community: Leading competition law
publications still do not directly address these changing dynamics.18 Additionally,
the same firms responsible for creating these problems dominate the academic
conversation about the state of competition in online markets. For example,
when Google was facing intense antitrust scrutiny in 2011, the company
made a major contribution to George Mason University’s Law and Economics
Center and directly funded a number of academic studies.19 The result was the
publication of a number of research papers defending Google and arguing that
intense competition exists in the industry.20 Google was then able to forward these
16. Ibid at 4-9.
17. Ibid at 203.
18. See e.g. Herbert Hovenkamp, Hovenkamp’s Federal Antitrust Policy, The Law of Competition
and Its Practice, 5th ed (St Paul, Minn: West Academic, 2016); Cassandra Brown & Brian
A Facey, Competition and Antitrust Laws in Canada: Mergers, Joint Ventures and Competitor
Collaborations, 2nd ed (Toronto: LexisNexis Canada, 2017).
19. David Dayen, “Google’s insidious shadow lobbying: How the Internet giant is bankrolling
friendly academics–and skirting federal investigations,” Salon (24 November 2015), online:
<www.salon.com/2015/11/24/googles_insidious_shadow_lobbying_how_the_internet_
giant_is_bankrolling_friendly_academics_and_skirting_federal_investigations/>.
20. See e.g. Joshua Wright, “Defining and Measuring Search Bias: Some Preliminary Evidence”
(2011) Intl Center L & Econ at 49-51.
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studies on to policymakers in an attempt to justify their practices.21 This type of
“intellectual capture” threatens the integrity of the regulatory environment and
Ezrachi and Stucke expect it to become more prevalent in future years.22 Virtual
Competition will hopefully inspire further independent study on lesser-known
anti-competitive forces and the actions of major players in these industries.
Through this discussion, readers’ perspectives of algorithm-driven markets
are likely to be challenged simply because the conclusions of the authors are
counterintuitive. With price transparency at an all-time high and millions of
options for applications only a tap away, there is clearly a powerful illusion of
competition in digital markets. Those who read this book are likely to come
away with a better understanding of the seriously overlooked negative market
consequences of popular new technologies, the value of their own data, and the
means by which competitive changes are negatively impacting consumer privacy
protections.23 Virtual Competition will also hopefully increase public awareness of
these issues and heighten pressure on competition authorities to modernize their
practices. As noted by Ezrachi and Stucke, the ability of competition authorities
to address many of these issues depends on how thoroughly they understand
how these digital innovations are fundamentally changing market dynamics.24
At present, it appears that many leading competition authorities may not even
have the tools to handle these issues, further highlighting the need for additional
empirical research on this topic.25

III. CONCLUSION
By shining light on the anti-competitive aspects of recent technological
advancements, Virtual Competition addresses a wide range of timely issues and
makes a major contribution to the field of competition law. Ezrachi and Stucke
convincingly employ real world case studies and behavioural economic analysis
to demonstrate the impact of newly emerging market dynamics. While strict
proponents of neoclassical economics may disagree with how the Chicago School
of economic thought is portrayed in this book, it will be hard for readers to
escape the conclusion that the invisible hand may no longer be an entirely viable
concept in an increasingly digitalized market universe.
21.
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Virtual Competition should also provoke additional conversation and research
on these consequential market shifts. As many of us—including laypeople and
regulatory authorities—do not recognize the impact that these developments are
already having on competition and consumer welfare, raising awareness right
now is critical. Beyond empirical research, future studies could address a number
of other unexplored topics that are touched upon by the authors. Notably, the
authors raise a number of relevant ethical questions—such as the extent to
which a human should be responsible for the actions of an algorithm they have
programmed—that were not fully addressed because the questions fell outside
the scope of the book.26 Hopefully, some of these questions will be explored in
more detail by future researchers, so as to better understand how to approach
enforcement and intervention in the markets.
In summary, Virtual Competition is a foundational piece in the emerging
field of digital competition and provides a framework for future research. Ezrachi
and Stucke utilize their novel concept of the “digitalized hand” to provoke readers
to reconsider how their data is being used in an increasingly digitalized economy
and demonstrate that data driven online markets will not necessarily correct
themselves. In doing so, they challenge regulatory authorities to modernize their
enforcement toolboxes and implement careful and measured intervention to
safeguard consumer welfare and promote competitive market environments in
the digital age.

26. Ibid at 78, 223.

